INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by certain ideas which arise in the theory of differential games (see [3, 41) . We abstract the particular features of differential games which are relevant in the notion of a positional game. Suppose S is a topological space, and g is a continuous real-valued function on S. We consider a game between two players, whom we call the maximizer and the minimizer, which falls into two phases. Phase 1. According to some given process, subject to control by both players and possibly random moves, a point s E S is determined.
Phase 2. The pay-off is computed as g(s). The aim of the maximizer is to maximize g(s), and similarly the minimizer aims to minimize g(s). This is best illustrated by a differential game. Consider a game with dynamics dx/dt = f(t, x, y, z) (1) and initial condition where x E Rm, f: R x R*' x Y x Z-t R is continuous and Lipschitz in the .r-variable, and Y and Z are compact metric spaces. Let UC R x Rm be an open set containing (to , x0), such that there exists T > to and if (t, X) E U then t < T. We shall assume that the maximizer controls the y-variable and the minimizer the z-variable in Eq. (1) .
Suppose now the pay-off is given by p = go*, dt*>), where g is a continuous function on aU and t* is the first time for which (t*, s(t")) I$ u. The game we have described is a game of survival ([4, Chap. 51) . This is an example of a positional game in which S = FU. The outcome of Phase I is a point of the topological space aU. In this particular game, there is no randomness involved. However, we can consider a stochastic differential game of survival (cf. [2, 51) with dynamics given by d.v =f(t, x, 3', z) dt + u(t, x) &a (4 in place of (I), where w is an m-dimensional Brownian motion and o(t, s) is an m s m-matrix-valued function satisfying certain measurability conditions. With the same form of the pay-off this is again a positional game. A much simpler example is a two-person zero-sum matrix game. Let S be the discrete space {(i,j): 1 -< i < m, 1 <i < n). Then a matrix game can be considered as a positional game in which Phase 1 consists of the determination of a pair of pure strategies (i,i), i.e., a point of S, and then in Phase 2 the pay-off g(i,i) is computed.
The object is to study the way in which the value of such a game varies with the pay-off function g. Of course, there may be several notions of value attached to a given positional game. For example, in a matrix game we may consider the upper value ti7+(g) = min max g(i,j) Recently Moulin [8] described another notion of value for matrix games, which is rather more difficult to formulate explicitly.
Equally, for differential games, there are many different concepts of value (see [3] , for example); in particular we would like to draw attention to the Danskin u-value [I].
Suppose S is compact and V: C(S) ---f R is a value function for some positional game. Then it is clear that V must satisfy certain conditions:
We call a functional on C(S) satisfying these three conditions a gamonic functional. The main result of this paper is that any gamonic functional can be realized as the upper value of a positional game. Thus, I/ has a representation in the form where $Y? is a collection of subsets of the space P(S) of Radon probability measures on S. In the first phase of the positional game the minimizer selects C E V, then the maximizer selects p E C, and then a point s E S is selected according to the probability measure p.
The other main results are concentrated on characterizing those functionals I' which arise from purely deterministic positional games, i.e., have a representation where 8 is a collection of subsets of S. By a utility transformation we mean a continuous increasing map @: R -R. If I' arises from a deterministic game then it is clear that for any utility transformation @ Here our main result is that if this equation holds for just one nonlinear utility transformation then V arises from a deterministic game.
The results in this paper were announced in [6] . The author intends to use these results to develop an abstract theory of differential games [7] .
POSITIVELY HOMOGENEOUS FUNCTIONALS ON LOCALLY CONVEX SPACES
Let X be a real locally convex topological vector space and let w: X-R be a uniformly continuous positively homogeneous functional on X. In this section we shall give a general representation theorem for w. Clearly p is positively homogeneous, and P(X + y) < p(.v) + p(y) for X, y E S. Hence p is sublinear. As w is uniformly continuous there exists a neighborhood U of 0 such that p( x < 1 for s E U. Hence p is continuous. ) DEFINITION 1. The support of w is the subset Supp w of S' of all linear functionals Q such that p(x) <p(x) for x E X.
We remark that Supp zu is a ~$27, X)-compact convex subset of X'. which is equicontinuous. Hence we may define
Nowfor/?ER+,
(A + PI fz G PLO + I.4 xl < P(PX + Y) + POX -y).
Hence and therefore
Hence (4) Combining (3) and (4), we see that for p, X E R, pa + Ml < P(P + $J), and hence by the Hahn-Banach theorem there is a linear functional 'p E X such that p)(z) ,< p(z), a E X and F(X) = a, q(y) = b. Nowforor,flER+, so that
Hence for y > 0
Also, for a E R, , a -Ax -ay) d ~69, so that for y > 0,
Combining (5) and (6), and the case y = 0 we obtain 6 < w(y). Thus a = q(x) > w(x), while b = v(y) < w(y) as required. Proof. By Zorn's lemma, let C, be a descending chain of w-admissible sets contained in C and let p&s) = itf rn;x (p(x). h Then p,, is sublinear and continuous, since p,(x) < max,,, F(X), and p,,(x) 3 w(x). Hence if CD0 = (9: T(X) < pO(s), Vs E X) then CPO is w-admissible and C,O C n C, . Proof. f+g<f+ maxg and by the positivity of V,
The sublinear functional g -max g is generated by the set P(S) of regular probability measures on S. Thus Lemma 3.1 implies that Supp VC P(S). We can now state formally our main theorem which is simply a rewording of Theorem 2.4. zohere A&'(V) is the collection of closed convex subsets C of P(S) ajhich are minimal zcith respect to the condition Uf> < ~2 /-fh f 6 C(S).
If we write V*(f) = -V(-f), then F'* is also gamonic. and hence \Ve deduce:
F(f) = max min f dp.
cE"qF-) LLeC . i
It is of interest to determine a similar representation for locally compact spaces S (particularly for application to stochastic differential games). Here we consider functionals defined on C,,(S) and note that P(S) is no longer a weak*-closed subset of C,(S)*. 1 f dp.
Proof. Let ,!? = S u (c~) be the one-point compactification of S and define 1': C(S) + R by
Then P is gamonic and so P(f) = F&t; y$FJ'f dPl where $9 is a collection of closed convex subsets of P(s). Now P(S) is weak*- Restricting to C,(S) we obtain the result.
A min-max theorem in this case is only apparently attainable under some additional assumptions. The author does not know whether it is true in general that V+(f) = V-(f) for all bounded Bore1 functions. In this section we show that this is the case for semicontinuous functions and also establish some monotone convergence theorems. PROPOSITION 
For aq g E B(S), V-(g) < V+(g).
Proof. Suppose C E A( I') and C' E A( V*). Suppose C n C' = @ ; then by the Hahn-Banach theorem, since both C and C' are weak*-compact, there exists f E C(S) such that However, V(f) < max,,, jf dp and V(f) > min,,,, sf dp. Hence it follows by contradiction that C n C' f o and therefore if g E B(S), and the result follows. THEOREM 4.2. Let f be a bounded lower-semicontinuous function on S and let {fa> be any increasing net of bounded lower-semicontinuous functions such that f = sup, fa . Then (9 v+(f) = m&,m) SUP,,C .ff dp;
Conversely, if g is a bounded upper-semicontinuous function and g is any decreasing net of bounded upper-semicontinu functions such that g = inf, g, , then 0)' Wg) 7 m=cE.m infuG, Sg 4;
Proof.
Clearly (i)', (ii)', and (iii)' are proved in precisely the same way as (i), (ii), and (iii), and so we shall only prove the first half of the theorem.
Let us suppose, to begin with, that the net {fm} consists of continuous functions and let o = sup, V(fa). We have immediately that ZJ < V+(f).
For each 01, let C, = {CL E P(S): jfm dp 9 v}; then C, is certainly V-admissible and hence, if p, is the associated sublinear functional, ~a(4 = zy j h 4 b W+ 01
The nets (C,) and (p,) decrease and hence, if We can now state our main theorem on deterministic functionals. Now suppose E is closed and EC S with I,(E) = 6, where 0 < 6 < 1. Since @ is monotonic, @ is differentiable on a dense subset of points of R. Hence F, contains a set E, E 8 and contrary to assumption. Hence V(f) = minEE8 maxSEEf(S) as required.
